Thursday, April 17, 2008

free will?



I just watched John Searle's talk at Google about the question of the existence of 'free will'. I'm going to gloss over the details (the video is above for anyone interested in reading it), but Searle offers two contradictory theories of Free will:

Theory the first

The mind, like all physical objects, is directly affected and determined by physical processes. Thus all thoughts that are considered 'free' are actually determined by a long, causal chain of events.

Theory the second

The mind's processes are at base determined by quantum-mechanical models of reality, and free will arises from these quantum-mechanical processes, which are not deterministic.


If you are an adherent to the philosophy that Free will exists, Searle argues, then you must accept theory #2. However this theory is unsatisfactory because Quantum processes are only 'random' insofar as we cannot understand them fully. If we come to understand Quantum mechanics fully, we will come to understand this randomness as part of our physical picture. Additionally, this 'randomness' of quantum-mechanics does not do justice to our notion of 'free will'--our decisions are not 'random' when we make them, though they are free. Therefore the two concepts are actually incompatible.

But Searle is begging the question: what exactly was the point of free will in the first place? In the past we believed it was important that an earth-centric astronomical model be proven, because otherwise the importance of the human race (at least, with relation to god) would be diminished.

Now, what is the real consequence of conceding: yes, there is no 'free will', as such? Well, if this makes you decide to simply let life come to you, and let yourself slip into indolence, then you are simply fulfilling your own destiny. Indeed, the importance of 'free will' is just that: even if it is a mere figment of our imagination, it impels us towards achieving the most we can in life, and helps us keep at bay the dismal thought that life does not amount to anything at all, and that the collective existence of humanity is nothing but a small pebble tumbling through the downward, unstoppable flow of the sands of time and space.

So does it matter, strictly speaking, that free will can be explained by cognitive science to be mere epiphenomenological froth? Nay, I say. We must speak in these matters with regard to use, not simply verificationist 'truth'. If physics can explain biology, does this demand that we discard biology in favor of it? Both are simply conceptual systems used to explain the phenomenological milieu. Why not say the same of 'free will'?

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